This directory contains a reference implementation for Chrome OS verified boot in firmware. ---------- Directory Structure ---------- The source is organized into distinct modules - firmware/ Contains ONLY the code required by the BIOS to validate the secure boot components. There shouldn't be any code in here that signs or generates images. BIOS should require ONLY this directory to implement secure boot. Refer to firmware/README for futher details. cgpt/ Utility to read/write/modify GPT partitions. Similar to GNU parted or any other GPT tool, but this has support for Chrome OS extensions. host/ Miscellaneous functions needed by userland utilities. futility/ The "firmware utility" tool, used to create, sign, and validate Chrome OS images. utility/ Random other utilities, not necesssarily related to verified boot as such. tests/ User-land tests and benchmarks that test the reference implementation. Please have a look at these if you'd like to understand how to use the reference implementation. build/ The output directory where the generated files will be placed, and where tests are run. scripts/ Tools and scripts used to generate and use new signing keypairs. These are typically used only on a secure machine. rust/ Rust bindings for vboot_reference. See rust/README.md for more details. -------------------- Building and testing -------------------- The suite can be built on the host or in the chroot environment. Building on the host could fail if certain packages are not installed. If there are host environment build problems due to missing .h files, try researching what packages the files belong to and install the missing packages before reporting a problem. The commands are the more-or-less expected ones: make make runtests make install [ DESTDIR=/usr/local ] ---------- Some useful utilities: ---------- futility vbutil_key Convert a public key into .vbpubk format futility vbutil_keyblock Wrap a public key inside a signature and checksum futility sign Sign a blob. Supported operations include: * Create a .vblock with signature info for a firmware image * Re-sign a firmware image * Pack a vmlinuz image, bootloader and config into a kernel partition futility verify Verify a blob such as a firmware image or a kernel partition dumpRSAPublicKey Dump RSA Public key (from a DER-encoded X509 certificate) in a format suitable for use by RSAVerify* functions in crypto/. ---------- Generating a signed firmware image: ---------- * Step 0: Build the tools, install them somewhere. * Step 1: Generate RSA root and signing keys. The root key is always 8192 bits. $ openssl genrsa -F4 -out root_key.pem 8192 The signing key can be between 1024-8192 bits. $ openssl genrsa -F4 -out signing_key.pem <1024|2048|4096|8192> Note: The -F4 option must be specified to generate RSA keys with a public exponent of 65535. RSA keys with 3 as a public exponent (the default) won't work. * Step 2: Generate pre-processed public versions of the above keys using dumpRSAPublicKey. This utility expects an x509 certificate as input, and emits an intermediate representation for further processing. $ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key root_key.pem -out root_key.crt $ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key signing_key.pem -out signing_key.crt $ dumpRSAPublicKey root_key.crt > root_key.keyb $ dumpRSAPublicKey signing_key.crt > signing_key.keyb ************** TODO: STUFF PAST HERE IS OUT OF DATE *************** At this point we have all the requisite keys needed to generate a signed firmware image. .pem RSA Public/Private Key Pair .crt X509 Key Certificate .keyb Pre-processed RSA Public Key * Step 3: Use utility/firmware_utility to generate a signed firmare blob. $ utility/firmware_utility --generate \ --root_key root_key.pem \ --firmware_sign_key signing_key.pem \ --firmware_sign_key_pub signing_key.keyb \ --firmware_sign_algorithm \ --firmware_key_version 1 \ --firmware_version 1 \ --in \ --out Where is based on the signature algorithm to use for firmware signining. The list of specifications can be output by running 'utility/firmware_utility' without any arguments. Note: --firmware_key_version and --firmware_version are part of a signed image and are used to prevent rollbacks to older version. For testing, they can just be set to valid values. * Step 4: Verify that this image verifies. $ utility/firmware_utility --verify \ --in --root_key_pub root_key.keyb Verification SUCCESS. Note: The verification functions expects a pointer to the pre-processed public root key as input. For testing purposes, root_key.keyb can be stored in RW part of the firmware. For the final firmware, this will be a fixed public key which cannot be changed and must be stored in RO firmware. ---------- Generating a signed kernel image: ---------- The steps for generating a signed kernel image are similar to that of a firmware image. Since verification is chained - RO firmware verifies RW firmware which verifies the kernel, only the keys change. An additional kernel signing key must be generated. The firmware signing generated above is the root key equivalent for signed kernel images.